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Wishner: Whose Work is it Anyway?: Revisiting Community for Creative Non-V

WHOSE WORK IS IT ANYWAY?: REVISITING
COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE V.
REID1 IN DEFINING THE EMPLOYEREMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE "WORK
MADE FOR HIRE" DOCTRINE
I. INTRODUCTION

The determination of who is the rightful owner to a copyrighted
object is one of the elements necessary in order to properly adjudicate
copyright infringement cases.2 That determination is not so easily
made when certain relationships exist between the parties, or, more
specifically, between an employer and an individual hired to complete
a work. This relationship is most commonly called a "work made for
hire."3 For situations that arise under such conditions, the Copyright
Act of 1976 ("Act")4 provides guidance to ascertain proper ownership.5 For this special purpose, the Act provides that:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author

1. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1988). Actually, the two requirements for showing copyright infringement are: (1) a valid copyright; and (2) copying. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d
1435, 1442 (9th Cir. 1994); Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d
1335, 1340 (5th Cir. 1994); Fisher-Price, Inc. v. Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 119,
122-23 (2d Cir. 1994); Brown Bag Software v. Symantee Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1472 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 198 (1992); Concrete Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments,
Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 605 (1st Cir. 1988). However, when the affirmative defense of "work
made for hire" is invoked, the determination of "who owns the copyright in the work becomes a necessary element." M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486,
1490 (llthCir. 1990); see also Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994)
("The presumption of authorial ownership falls, however, if the work is made 'for hire,' such
as one 'prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment."' (quoting
Reid, 490 U.S. at 737-38)).
3. Where appropriate, the phrase "work for hire" may be interchanged with the term
"work made for hire."
4. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
5. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b), 501(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all
of the rights comprised in the copyright.'
Furthermore, the Act defines a "work made for hire" as:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a
contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work,
as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered
a work made for hire....2
However, if the Act was limited to this definition alone, the determination of who owns the valid copyright in a "work made for hire"
situation would certainly be a formidable task. The purpose of this
Note is to effectually determine exactly what relationship must exist
between two parties for the hiring party to be termed an "employer"
and the hired party to be termed an "employee" for the purpose of
the "work made for hire" doctrine.' In doing so, the landmark case
of Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid9 will be discussed
and heavily relied upon. Further discussion will include the federal
circuit and district courts' utilization of the Reid decision in their
holdings and how they help to shape the "work made for hire" doctrine in order to make determining the status of an "employer" and
an "employee" in these situations a simpler task.

6. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
8. This Note is primarily concerned with the first of the two definitions for "work
made for hire" under § 101, i.e., a "work prepared by an employee within the scope of his
or her employment." Id. However, some consideration will be given to specially ordered or
commissioned works.

9. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
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II. WORKS MADE FOR HIRE -

395

A BRIEF STATUTORY AND CASE

HISTORY

A. THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT
The only provision of the 1909 Copyright Act regarding this
matter states that "the word 'author' shall include an employer in the
case of works made for hire."'" There is no further definition of
"author"; nor are there definitions provided for "employer" or "works
made for hire."" With nothing else to provide further insight into
copyright ownership in these situations, the courts were left to define
the above terms.2 The approach taken by the courts was that the
work for hire doctrine applied only to "works made by employees in
the regular course of their employment."' 3 Furthermore, the copyright
ownership in commissioned works was continually found to be held
by the commissioning party because it was assumed that the copyright, along with the work, was conveyed to the hiring party. 4
In the mid-1960's, a proposal by the Register of Copyrights was
adopted by Congress to extend the definition of "work made for hire"
to any "work prepared by an employee within the scope of his employment."'" The final draft also included four specific categories of
commissioned works where, if the parties expressly stated so in writing, the copyright of the commissioned work would be held exclusively by the hiring party. 6 This revision was the stepping stone for
the provisions of the "work made for hire" doctrine in the 1976 Act.

10. Copyright Act of 1909, ch.1, § 26 (1909) [hereinafter 1909 Act], as amended by Act
of July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652, revised in its entirety by The Copyright Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (1988

& Supp. V 1993)).
11. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch.1, § 26 (1909).
12. Reid, 490 U.S. at 744; Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir.
1989); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 831 F. Supp. 295, 311 (S.D.N.Y.), opinion modified
on reargument, 840 F. Supp. 256 (1993).
13. Reid, 490 U.S. at 744.

14. Id.
15. Id. at 746 (citations omitted).
16. Id. The four enumerated categories were: works for use "as a contribution to a col-

lective work, as a part of a motion picture, as a translation, or as a supplementary work." Id.
Four other categories were later adopted by the House Committee. They included: compila-

tions, instructional texts, tests, and atlases. Id. at 747. It must be emphasized that this special
attention given to commissioned works was limited to these categories alone.
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THE YEARS 1978 TO 1989

The Copyright Act of 1976 was passed as a general revision of
its predecessor. 7 It also aided in aligning federal law with the
changing of the times and society. 8 The new Act provided for a
special section regarding ownership of copyright in works made for
hire 9 as well as providing a definition for the term "work made for
hire."' However, the Act failed to define the key terms "employee,"
"employer," or "scope of employment."' Once again, interpretation
of these terms was left to the courts.
The first of the three famed cases leading to the Supreme
Court's decision in Reid was Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel,
Inc.' There, the Second Circuit agreed with the district court's
charge that an individual is in a work for hire situation when that
person "act[s] under the direction and supervision of the hiring author, at the hiring author's instance and expense."' Further, the circuit court affirmed the lower court's instruction that "lt does not
matter whether the for-hire creator is an employee in the sense of
having a regular job with the hiring author. What matters is whether
the hiring author caused the work to be made and exercised the right
to direct and supervise the creation."24 The court rejected the argument that the new Act defined employment relationships to include
only "regular" employees.' Rather, the court chose to employ the
general laws of agency, reasoning that Congress suggested that the

17. The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (current version at
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
18. For instance, computer programs have now gained protection through the Copyright
Act of 1976. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) ("Limitations on Exclusive
Rights: Computer Programs"). There was no need for such provisions in the 1909 Act since
the advent of computers had not yet occurred.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988); see also supra text accompanying note 6.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also supra text accompanying note 7.
21. Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1989).
22. 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984). In Aldon Accessories, the
wholesaler of a statuette brought a copyright infringement action against a retail cataloguer,
Spiegel, Inc. ("Spiegel"), who was selling a nearly identical replica. Id. at 549-51. Spiegel
argued that the copyright was invalid because the work was not a work made for hire, and
that the trial judge gave an erroneous instruction on the "work made for hire" provision. Id.
at 550-51.
23. Id. at 551.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 552. This argument was proposed by the defendant-appellant, Spiegel, Inc.
26. Id.
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courts address the laws of agency since the "key terms" were not
defined in the Act.27
In 1987, the holding in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults v. Playboy Enterprises, was handed down by the
Fifth Circuit. 29 The court properly pointed out that the primary problem with the statute was the ambiguity of some of its terms." In the
court's analysis, it chose to discuss three interpretations from the
multitude of past decisions regarding this doctrine and then chose

from them'

In deciding that "The Literal Interpretation" was the

proper way to adjudicate such cases, the court held that the method
for determining ownership of a copyright in a work made for hire

situation was to "first determine -

using agency law rules[ ] -

whether or not the seller is an employee or an independent contractor.
Then, the court should apply the statute."'32 The court criticized the
' as
"compromise"33
set forth in Aldon Accessories because it reasoned

that the "actual control" test will ordinarily make the "buyer" a coauthor of the work.34 Also criticized was that the "actual control"
test could vary the outcome "between the same buyer and same seller

27. Id.
28. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 820 F.2d 1223 (1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
981 (1988). Ronnie Kole, acting on behalf of the Easter Seal Society ("Society'), contracted
with a public television station to videotape a staged "Mardi-Gras-style" parade and "Dixieland" musical concert. Id. at 324. Kole had some, but very limited, involvement in the actual
taping and choreography of the event. Id. The public television station, at a later date, gave
a copy of portions of the footage to a Canadian television producer who used part of the
tape in an adult film entitled "Candy, the Stripper." Id. at 324-25. It was eventually distributed to Playboy, Inc., who aired it on cable television. Id. at 325. The Society sued Playboy,
alleging copyright infringement. Id. Playboy claimed that the work was the copyrighted product of the public television station who voluntarily distributed it. Id. The Society claimed that
the public television station was a work for hire and, therefore, the videotape was the
Society's copyrighted product. Id. The court held against the Easter Seal Society. Id. at 337.
29. As Circuit Judge Gee noted, the set of events leading up to this court action lent its
hands to the "most delightful of case names: Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children v.
Playboy Enterprises;,seriously rivaled, in [the court's] judgment, only by United States v. 11
114 Dozen Packages of Article Labeled in Part Mrs. Moffat's Shoo Fly Powders for Drunkenness, 40 F. Supp. 208 (W.D.N.Y. 1941) . . . and United States ex rel. Mayo v. Satan and
Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 325 n.1.
his Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D. Pa. 1971) .
30. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 328.
31. The three interpretations were given the following names by the court: "The Literal
Interpretation," id. at 329; "The Conservative Interpretation," id. at 331; and "The Aldon
Accessories Compromise." Id.
32. Id. at 329. The court defined the word "buyer" as "the putative legal employer
claiming ownership under the 'work for hire' doctrine," and "seller" as "the person against
whom a buyer claims, whether an employee or an independent contractor." Id.
33. Id. at 331.
34. Id. at 333.
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' Ultimately, the Easter Seal
in a series of works produced together."35
court said that the new holding provided "the greatest predictability"
'
and a "certain moral symmetry" between the "buyer" and "seller."36

The final case of the trilogy was handed down in early 1989. In
Dumas v. Gommerman 7 the Ninth Circuit held that "[o]nly the
works of formal, salaried employees are covered by § 101(1). " '3By
interpreting the work made for hire doctrine this way, the court created three categories of independent contractors: actual "employees,"
who were termed so because of the hiring party's supervision and
control; those whose work product fell under the commissioned works

category of § 101(2); and those whose works were simply not works
for hire.39 The Dumas court agreed with the Fifth Circuit's decision

in Easter Seal to use the laws of agency, but only inasmuch as they
were necessary to help determine the status of the parties when their
relationship is ambiguous.'
III.

COMMUNITY FOR CREATiVE NON-VIOLENCE V. REID
A. THE FACTs

In 1985 the organization Community for Creative Non-Violence
("CCNV") entered into an oral agreement with James Earl Reid, a
sculptor, to produce a statue depicting the plight of the homeless for
a Christmas pageant in Washington, D.C." Members of CCNV visit-

35. Id.
36. Id. at 335. The court said that moral symmetry would be gained by this proposal
because it makes the buyer a "statutory 'author' if and only if he is responsible for the
negligent acts of the seller. For example, a buyer will only be the 'author' of a writing if he
would be liable under respondeat superior in a defamation action based on that writing." Id.
37. 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989). Jennifer Dumas, the widow of the graphic artist
Patrick Nagel, filed suit against Gommerman for copyright infringement of Nagel's works. Id.
at 1094. Nagel had been commissioned by ITT Cannon for four works of art that lIT Cannon would distribute as lithographs for a promotional campaign. Id. Gommerman, the owner
of an art gallery, bought the original paintings and copyrights from lIT Cannon several years
later. Id. He registered each of the four works in his own name and made poster reproducdons of the works. Id. Dumas claimed that the copyrights in the paintings were owned by
her, as Nagel's executor, and that Gommerman's reproductions were infringing upon her
copyrights. Id. at 1094-95. Gommerman argued that Nagel's paintings were works made for
hire and so he properly bought the copyrights from ITT Cannon. Id. at 1095-96. The court
found that Nagel was not a work for hire under the Copyright Act of 1976 and held in
favor of Dumas. Id. at 1105.
38. Id. at 1102.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1105.
41. Reid, 490 U.S. at 733.
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ed Reid on a number of occasions to monitor the statue's progress.'
Reid accepted most of CCNV's suggestions and directions.' When
finished, CCNV paid Reid the last of the agreed upon installments for
the statue entitled "Third World America."' When CCNV later
asked for modifications on the statue so that they could bring it
abroad, Reid refused and denied CCNV use of the statue unless they
made a more durable replica.45 As a result, both parties filed competing copyright registration certificates.' The question of ownership
then arose and CCNV fied suit seeking a determination of the ownership of copyright in the statue.47 The district court ruled in favor
of CCNV, holding that the statue was a "work made for hire" under
the Act and, therefore, CCNV held the exclusive copyright to the
work.' The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia reversed, holding that the sculpture "was not prepared by
an employee" within the scope of his or her employment under §
101(1) of the Act, and that Reid was an independent contractor.4 9
The court of appeals also held that the sculpture did not fall under
any of the nine enumerated categories of "specially ordered or commissioned" works," and so it was not a work made for hire under
the § 101(2) definition of work made for hire.5

B. THE ISSUE
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the proper
construction of the "work made for hire" provisions of the Act.5 2
Specifically, the question of law presented was whether Reid was an
"employee" within the meaning of the statute, which states that a
work is made for hire if it is prepared by an employee within scope
of his or her employment.53

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
panying
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 734.
Id.
Id. at 735.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 735-36.
Id. at 736.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 201-14 and accomtext.
Reid, 490 U.S. at 736.
Id.
Id. at 738; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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C. THE DECISION

The Supreme Court held that Reid retained copyright ownership
in the sculpture. 4 The main focus was on a set of factors enumerated under the common law of agency." Although not all of the factors were held in Reid's favor, enough of them were to satisfy the
Court that Reid was not an employee of CCNV within the scope of
the "work made for hire" doctrine under the Act 6
IV. THE "REID FAcrORS"

A. THE ORIGIN
Initially, the Reid Court had to ascertain from where they were
going to extract the definitions of the key terms of the statute. 7 The
Court utilized the well-established doctrine that "[w]here Congress
uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under ...
the
common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates,
that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these
terms."'8 Drawing upon their past need to define the word "employee" where Congress had omitted a definition for it in a statute,59 the
Court concluded that "Congress intended to describe the conventional
master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine."' Indeed, the laws of agency have been designed to accommodate definitional barriers when they should arise.6' It was appropriately pointed out that the utilization of the general common law of
agency - as opposed to the definitions found in the employment
laws of any particular state - is a practical approach, since it will
necessarily reflect the fact that "federal statutes are generally intended
to have uniform nationwide application."62 It is a rational conclusion
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Reid, 490 U.S. at 753.
Id. at 751-52.
Id. at 752-53.
Id. at 738-39.
Id. at 739 (quoting NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981)) (alteration

in original).
59. See, e.g., Kelley v. Southern Pac. Co., 419 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1974); Baker v. Texas
& Pac. Ry. Co., 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959) (per curiam).
60. Reid, 490 U.S. at 740.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCy § 220(1) cmt. c (1958) (stating that the
relation of master to servant "is an important relation in that upon it depends the liability of
the master to third persons and to his employees under the provisions of various statutes").
62. Reid, 490 U.S. at 740 (quoting Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,
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that, when the federal courts are mandated by Congress to be the
forum of original jurisdiction regarding a federal statute, the laws that
those courts draw upon be ones of national implication, and not one
of any particular state, as this would otherwise lead to a non-uniform
federal adjudication of cases.
Indeed, other courts have also held conclusively, in following the
analysis of Reid, that the laws of agency should be the first step in
determining whether the hired individual was an employee within the
meaning of the statute. 3 In Marco v. Accent Publishing Co.," the
Third Circuit stated that:
We use the terms employee and independent contractor to refer to
the legal status of a hired party. Where the Restatement [of Agency]
uses the expression master-servant relation, we use the expression
employment relationship to refer to the relation between parties that
defines employee status in the hired party.'
In using the two expressions "employee" and "independent contractor"
as synonyms for one another, the Marco court virtually redesigned
Title 17 of the United States Code to include the master-servant doctrine from the general common-law of agency as part of its
definitional approach to the status of "author" when using the work
made for hire doctrine.

490 U.S. 30, 43 (1989)).
63. See, e.g., Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994) (using the
RESTATENENT (SECOND) OF AGENCy § 228 (1958) for this purpose); Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1549-50 n.2 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that "[t]he term servant as
used in the Restatement (2d) of Agency Sec. 220 [sic] is a synonym for employee as used

in most statutes, including the work for hire provision of the Copyright Ace') (emphasis
omitted); Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1103 (1991); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1491 (11th
Cir. 1990); Respect, Inc. v. Committee On Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1117 (N.D.

Ill. 1993).
64. 969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir. 1992).
65. Id. at 1549 n.2 (emphasis omitted).
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THE "REID FACTORS"

As discussed above,' the factors that the Reid Court primarily
based their determination of what an employee was under the work
made for hire doctrine were dependent upon the general common
laws of agency. The Restatement (Second) of Agency lists, as part of
determining whether one who acts for another is a servant or independent contractor, the following factors:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master
may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools and the place of work for the person doing the
work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of
the employer,
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.'
Removed from this list of ten factors without explanation in the Reid
Court's decision were subsections (b), (c), (h), and (i).6 However,
added to the remaining list of six factors were:
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to
the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when
and how long to work; ... the hired party's role in hiring and
paying assistants; . . . the provision of employee benefits; and the

tax treatment of the hired party. 69

66.
67.
68.
signals
factors
69.

See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
See Reid, 490 U.S. at 752. Oddly, Justice Marshall's majority opinion specifically
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, as "setting forth a nonexhaustive list of
relevant to determining whether a hired party is an employee." Id.
Id. at 751-52 (citations omitted). Justice Marshall cites to case history in support of

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol12/iss2/7

10

Wishner: Whose Work is it Anyway?: Revisiting Community for Creative Non-V
1995]

The Employer-Employee Relationship Under the "Work Made for Hire" Doctrine

403

The Marco court later altered the test to include those factors omitted
from the Restatement by Justice Marshall in Reid."° Furthermore,
added to the list was one more factor: "actual control over the details
of the work."' Thus, a total of sixteen factors could be considered
when assessing whether an individual was an employee under the
work made for hire doctrine of the Copyright Act of 1976.

C. THE "REID FACToRs" DEFINED
The Hiring Party's Right To Control The Development of the Work
The first factor is the hiring party's right to control the hired
individual's development of the work at issue. The Court's agency
standard in Reid "focuses on [the] right to control the manner and
means of production, rather than the right to control the product
itself." Although this factor may be an important one, and in many
situations may be determinative, the extent of the "right to control
needed to establish the relation of master and servant may be very
attenuated." For instance, in a situation where the employer has
agreed not to exercise any control over the work, this factor may
apparently hold in the employee's favor, but actually inure to the
benefit of the employer.74 This is so because the employee has
agreed to be considered a servant, but has requested that the employer
relinquish any direct control over the work.
In Marco, the work which was the source of litigation was a
photograph taken by Ed Marco ("Marco") for Accent Publishing Co.,
Inc. ("Accent").75 Whereas Accent could control the subject matter
and the composition of the images, it could not control most aspects
of the work, including light sources, filters, lenses, camera, film,

his decision to include these factors, as well as citing to case history in support of the factors taken directly from the Restatement Id. at 751-52 nn.18-31 (citations omitted); see also
Herbert v. United States, No. 92-672 C., 1994 WL 636456, at *5 (C1. Ct. Nov. 15, 1994)
(reiterating the same list of factors).

70. Marco, 969 F.2d at 1550.
71. Id. In adding this factor, the Marco court stated the Reid Court veritably did "consider[ ] the [Petitioner's] actual direction of work....Id. at 1550 n.4.
72. 1 MELvLLE B. NMMER & DAVID NP&MER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
5.03[B][1][a1[iii] at 5-22 (1994) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that the artist's liberty
to design and place the sculptures at will to be a factor in favor of non-employee status).
73. RE TATE mNT (SEcoND) Op AGENcY § 220(1) cmt. d (1958).
74. See id. (illustrating such a situation).
75. Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir. 1992).
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perspective, aperture setting, shutter speed and processing techniques.76 Accordingly, this factor was held in favor of the photogra7
pher.7
In Aymes v. Bonelli," the parties disputed the ownership of a
series of computer programs. 79 The hiring party, although not necessarily having the computer programming skills necessary for the complete development of the program, gave significant input to its construct and administered programming limitations, enough to deem the
hired party an employee for purposes of this factor."
Whether the Party Employed Is Engaged in a Distinct
Business & The Kind of Occupation
These two factors are often interlinked with one another. They
are aimed at determining whether the hired party was in business at
all, and whether it was a regular part of that party's business to perform the task or function that was accomplished.8
If the hired party was in a business which supplied services
similar to those that were performed, this factor would lean in the
hired party's favor.82 However, if that person was not in business at
all, or was in a business but provided a service for the hiring party
using a skill that is wholly unrelated to that which is regularly used
in that person's occupation, then this factor would weigh more heavily in the hiring party's favor.
The "kind of occupation" factor refers to that of the hired individual. If the person who was hired is one who regularly performs
that type of workmanship, this factor will generally hold for that
party.83 In Reid, the Court pointed out that Reid was indeed a sculptor. 4 What the Court did not add to this determination was whether
or not, even though the hired party performed that particular type of
workmanship, it was necessary for the hired individual to regularly or
occasionally perform those services for a hiring party. Although Reid

76.
77.

Id. at 1551-52.
See id. at 1552.

78. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
79. Id. at 858-59.
80. Id. at 862.

81. See, e.g., M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1492 (l1th
Cir. 1990) (holding that it was part of the hired party's business to provide skilled drafting
services).
82. Id.
83. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 752.

84. Id.
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was a sculptor, the Court never discussed whether or not it was his
habit or custom to create a sculpture upon request.
The Skill Required in the Particular Occupation
The skill required in a particular occupation is an important
factor in the work made for hire analysis. Where skill is required, "if
the occupation is one which ordinarily is considered as ... an incident of the business establishment of the employer, there is an inference that the actor is a servant.""5 The skill that must be examined
is that which is necessary to perform the work. 6 Consequently,
when the hired party is a skilled craftsman, that factor will weigh
heavily in the hired person's favor.87
In Marco, the court addressed the skill required of a magazine
photographer.88 In disagreeing with the district court's decision that
the photographer was not a skilled worker, the Third Circuit held
that:
In this age of Polaroids and Handicams, the photography profession
might not demand the expertise once required to create an image.
Nonetheless, something beyond owning a camera is necessary to
make photographs suitable for a trade journal. Accent, after all, did
not hire Marco off the street; Accent hired him after seeing his
portfolio. Accent's own Art Director testified that "[Marco is] the
person that makes the shot work technically .... That's why I hire
a photographer, I'm not a professional photographer, I'm an art
director."
Photographers, moreover, fall along a spectrum in their skills.
Near one end fall the likes of Ansel Adams, recording the American
landscape with an 8 x 10 view camera. Near the other falls an
untrained clerk, snapping mug shots with an instamatic. Marco, with
a degree in photography and ten years experience, falls somewhere
in between. As a factual matter, Marco may not be skilled in the
sense that Ansel Adams was skilled. From a legal perspective, however, Marco is certainly skilled in the sense that Reid, the sculptor
in the CCNV case, was skilledY

85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) cmt. i (1958).
86. See Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1992).
87. Id.; see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)

(holding that artists and sculptors are "highly skilled occupations," a fact which cuts against
the employer).
88. Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1551 (3d Cir. 1992).
89. Id. (citation omitted).
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The Marco decision made it clear that the degree of skill in the art
did not have to be one equal to a master in that field for this factor
to be held in favor of the hired party." Rather, much like the Patent
Law requirement of non-obviousness for an invention to be newly
patented,9' the skill required appears to be that which is possessed
by an individual who is of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.'
The Supplier of Instrumentalities, Tools and Place of Work
An important inquiry is who is the owner of the tools and instrumentalities being used, as well as the place in which the work is
actually performed.
The fact that a worker supplies his own tools is some evidence that
he is not a servant. On the other hand, if the worker is using his
employer's tools or instrumentalities, especially if they are of substantial value, it is normally understood that he will follow the directions of the owner in their use, and this indicates that the owner
is the master. This fact is, however, only of evidential value93
In Reid, the sculptor supplied his own tools and used his own studio
in which to complete the sculpture.94 This factor was indisputably
held in Reid's favor.95 In MacLean Associates, Inc. v. Wm.M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc.,'e the question of ownership in a computer program was at issue.' The Third Circuit, in remanding the
district court's decision to grant a directed verdict to the hiring party,
held that a question of fact for the jury was established, pointing out
that, among other factors which held in the hired party's favor, the
appellant "worked with his own software on his own computer at his
own facility to complete the [hiring party's] obligation."9' 8
An example in which this factor would cut in favor of the employer is in a situation where a toy manufacturer employs an individ-

90. Id.
91. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
92. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (enunciating this requirement for non-obviousness under the Patent Law).
93. RESTA'hMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) cnt. k (1958).
94. Reid, 490 U.S. at 752.

95. Id.
96. 952 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1991).
97. Id. at 771-72.
98. Id. at 777; see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228, 234 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (holding that plaintiffs' use of thousands of dollars of raw material for which they

were not reimbursed to be a factor in favor of non-employee status).
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ual to design a new remote controlled vehicle on the manufacturer's
premises. The employee uses the large construction and electrical
equipment supplied to him by the toy manufacturer but supplies his
own set of computer programs in helping to make certain design
calculations. Here, although some of the hired party's instrumentalities
are his own, the totality of the evidence weighs heavier in the
employer's favor for this factor.
Length of Time of Employment & Method of Payment
The "length of time of employment" and "method of payment"
factors tend to be somewhat intertwined and can be very important.
"If the time of employment is short, ... the job is more likely to be
considered [the hired party's] job than the job of the one employing
him. This is especially true if payment is to be made by the job and
not by the hour."" ,
In Reid, the sculptor was employed for the length of time that it
took to complete the artwork, which was less than two months, a
relatively short period of time."° In addition, he was paid a set
amount for the job in a set of installments, which is typical of an
independent contractor relationship.' Consequently, the combination
of these two aspects tends to weigh in favor of a non-employee status. The court in Marco found that the existence of the relationship
between the parties for a period of only six months without any
regular schedule or regular hours was a poor indication of any actual
employment relationship; whereas if the relationship was one in which
the work was scheduled and periodic, or full time, this would be a
more tantamount indication of employee status."~
Whether Work is Part of the Employer's Regular Business
Simply put, this factor addresses whether or not it
nary business practice for the hiring party to employ
services supplied by the hired individual. When it is
practice to employ persons to complete that task, this
cut heavier in the hiring party's favor. 3

was an ordithe type of
a customary
factor would

99. REsTATaEMNT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) cmt. j (1958).
100. Reid, 490 U.S. at 752-53.
101. Id. at 753 (citing Holt v. Winpisinger, 811 F.2d 1532, 1540 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Reid
was paid $15,000 for his work. Id.
102. Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1551 (3d Cir. 1992).
103. MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769,
777 (3d Cir. 1991).
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In MacLean Associates, the Third Circuit held this factor in the

computer programmer's favor because the hiring party's regular business was compensation consulting, further finding it obvious that the
employer did not normally provide such software to its clients - the
precise reason for which the program was designed.'O°
The Parties' Beliefs

This factor, though given some consideration, is not overly important. "It is not determinative that the parties believe or disbelieve
that the relation of master and servant exists, except insofar as such

belief indicates an assumption of control by the one and submission
to control by the other."' 0 5
In MacLean Associates, the court stated that:
Nor does the district court's determination that [the appellant] was
an apparent agent ...survive scrutiny.... [T]he central focus of
the work for hire doctrine is upon the relationship between the
person performing the work and the person paying him to perform
the work .... The fact that the [employer's client] thought that
[appellant] was an employee.., is of no moment.'"
In total, the belief by both of the parties that the person employed is
a work for hire may be of some value."l It also helps to determine
the amount of control that the hiring party may exert over the hired
individual." 8 But where the parties' beliefs differ, this factor will

generally not fall to one side or the other."

104. Id.; see also Reid, 490 U.S. at 753 (stating that "[c]reating sculptures was hardly
'regular business' for CCNV" (citation omitted)); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp.
228, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that, since the hiring party was "not in the business of
creating, marketing, or exploiting works of art or sculpture," this evidence favored the hired
party).
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) cmt. m (1958).
106. MacLean Assocs., 952 F.2d at 777-78 (emphasis added).
107. Id.; see also Saenger Org., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Licensing Assocs., 864 F. Supp.
246, 248-49 (D. Mass. 1994) (relying on parties' beliefs in determining that hired party was
acting within the scope of employment, enough to meet the irreparable harm prong of the
test enunciated by the court for injunctive relief).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) cmt. m (1958).
109. By nature of the "work made for hire" doctrine in a copyright infringement lawsuit,
if the parties' beliefs did not differ, there would most likely be no dispute at all, since there
would be no question of ownership.
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Whether the Hiring Party is in Business
This factor is distinguishable from that discussed earlier concerning whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer"' in that it addresses whether that hiring party is actually in a
business operation at all.
Although this factor will generally fall in the hiring party's favor, there have been occasions where it has not. For example, in
Reid, CCNV was a charity organization and was "not a business at
all."''. Consequently, this factor was resolved in Reid's favor. Another case which held that the hiring party was not in a distinct business was Respect Inc. v. Committee On Status Of Women."' The
court, in a contest over the ownership of the copyright in a text on
sexual abstinence education, explained that the defendant was not "a
business in the normal (or commercial) exercise of the term - clearly it did not have a history of employing persons like [the co-plaintiff] or of publishing textbooks, factors that would cut in its favor.
Instead, rather uncommonly, [defendant] ... regenerated itself because the opportunity arose to commission [the co-plaintiff]."".
Hiring Party's Right to Assign Additional Projects to Hired Party
The availability of the hiring party's right to assign additional
projects to the individual hired is a factor that, although not listed in
the Restatement of Agency, is important and is one that has been
addressed by numerous courts." 4 This factor deals specifically with
whether the hiring party could assign additional work without any
further contractual negotiations or addenda."5
In Marco, the Third Circuit held that the district court's failure
to address this factor was improper." 6 In this lawsuit over the copyright ownership of a freelance photographer's pictures, the court stated:

110. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
111. Reid, 490 U.S. at 753.
112. 815 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D. III. 1993).
113. Id. at 1118.
114. See, e.g., Reid, 490 U.S. at 751; Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 863 (2d Cir.
1992); Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1551 (3d Cir. 1992); MacLean
Assocs. v. Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 777 (3d Cir. 1991);
M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1990); Carter
v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
115. Marco, 969 F.2d at 1550-51.
116. Id. at 1551.
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Although the district court considered Accent's right to require
Marco to reshoot unsatisfactory images, this right was merely a
right to final approval, which differs from the right to assign more
work. The record does not suggest that Accent could assign any
more than one issue's worth of photographs to Marco during any
particular period."'
Consequently, this factor weighed in favor of the photographer because the hiring party was unable to assign Marco any shoots, other
than the one for which he was specifically hired.
Utilizing similar reasoning in Aymes, the Second Circuit held that
the right the appellees had in assigning additional work to the appellant was "fairly strong evidence that [the appellant] was an employee,
since independent contractors are typically hired only for particular
projects. ' n5
Extent of Hiring Party's Discretion Over When
and How Long to Work
This factor has also been relied upon by the courts and may
weigh heavily in determining employment status for the purposes of
copyright ownership in a work made for hire situation." 9
In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.," ° the district court
held that the writer of an article for New Yorker Magazine was the
owner of the article's copyright in a libel suit.' One of the factors
that was held to weigh in favor of non-employee status was that of
the lack of opportunity for the magazine to control the hours and
days for which the writer was to work." There, the writer was not
required to be at the magazine's office on any given day or at any
given time." Similarly, the Marco court said that the hired party's
ability to work without any regular hours and without any regular
schedule was further indication that the photographer was not an

117. Id.
118. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863.
119. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 753; Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863-64; Marco, 969 F.2d at 1550;
MacLean Assocs., 952 F.2d at 777; M.G.B. Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d at 1492; Masson v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
120. 832 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
121. Id. at 1375. This case is odd in that the hiring party wanted to escape ownership of
copyright under the "work made for hire" label in order to avoid liability under a libel suit.
Id. at 1354-55 & n.3.
122. Id. at 1375.
123. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol12/iss2/7

18

Wishner: Whose Work is it Anyway?: Revisiting Community for Creative Non-V
1995]

The Employer-Employee Relationship Under the "Work Made for Hire" Doctrine

411

employee. 24 The Marco decision also noted that the court below
considered the imposition of a deadline for the required work; however, it ruled that deadlines in no way alter the independent contractor's
discretion over work hours."2 As a result, the inability of an employer to determine the daily and hourly work schedule of a hired
party is an indication that the hired party is an independent contractor
rather than an employee.
The Hired Party's Role in Hiring and Paying Assistants
When the hired party has complete discretion in hiring and firing
assistants and provides those assistants with monetary compensation
out of her own pocket, this factor will weigh in favor of non-employee status." This was the case in Reid, since the sculptor had absolute discretion in the hiring and paying of any assistants that may

have been necessary."2

Employee Benefits & The Tax Treatment of the Hired Party
The receipt of, or providing for, employee benefits and the method of tax payment are two important factors in determining employee

status and have been relied upon by most courts in work made for
hire copyright ownership lawsuits."
These two factors, although discussed simultaneously here be-

cause of their somewhat rational interdependency, can be considered
separately when they seemingly cut in favor of one party with regard
to the first factor and in favor of the other party for the second con-

124. Marco, 969 F.2d at 1551; see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228,
234 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding this factor in favor of non-employment status since plaintiffs,
although required to work a minimum number of hours on any given week, were also allowed to work additional hours and often did, in addition to having had access to the work
premises twenty-four hours a day).
125. Marco, 969 F.2d at 1550.
126. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 753; M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d
1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1990).
127. Reid, 490 U.S. at 753; see also Carter, 852 F. Supp. at 234 (holding that the
plaintiffs' employing of unpaid assistants held in favor of non-employee status); M.G.B.
Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d at 1492 (holding that the hired party's total discretion in the hiring
and firing of employees without any interference by the hiring party to be a factor in the
hired party's favor).
128. See, e.g., Reid, 490 U.S. at 753; Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 862 (2d Cir.
1992); MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 777
(3d Cir. 1991); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1492 (lth Cir.
1990); Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1350, 1375 (N.D. Cal. 1993);
Respect Inc. v. Committee On Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1118 (N.D. ll.1993).
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dition.' 9 In Respect Inc., the court noted the fact that the plaintiff
had taxes withheld from her paycheck was not entirely indicative of
commissioned status. 3 ' Indeed, the plaintiff, "who did not receive
employee benefits in the customary use of the term, explained without
contradiction that parties who retained her to consult or lecture often
withheld her taxes.'. Accordingly, this factor weighed in favor of
non-employee status.
In Aymes, the Second Circuit held that "[t]he failure ...
to
extend Aymes any employment benefits or to pay any of his payroll
taxes is highly indicative that Aymes was considered an outside independent contractor .. . ."" The court proceeded to call this type of
treatment of the hired individual a "virtual admission" that he was an
independent contractor and not an employee under the doctrine.'
Also noted was that it would be an unfair practice if the hiring party
was able to receive the benefit of both not having to provide benefits
for the hired individual as well as not paying a percentage of that
person's payroll taxes, and then denying that person an independent
contractor status merely for purposes of avoiding liability in a copyright infringement suit.'34 It was these undisputed facts - a practice
that was deliberately administered by the hiring party - that led the
court to conclude that the defense of "work made for hire" in this
copyright action was wholly unsubstantiated. 3 ' Consequently, it is
apparent that this factor is one of great importance in this expansive
list.

129. See, e.g., Respect Inc., 815 F. Supp. at 1118 (illustrating an example where no benefits were received, but where taxes were withheld).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862; see also Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228,

234 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (favoring non-employee status when there are no insurance benefits supplied).
133. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 862-63. Judge Altimari, writing for the Second Circuit, said that "[the importance of these two factors is underscored by the fact that every case since Reid that has
applied the test has found the hired party to be an independent contractor where the hiring
party failed to extend benefits or pay social security taxes." Id. at 863 (citations omitted).
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The Actual Control the Hiring Party Demonstrated
Over Details of the Work
This, the final of the sixteen factors considered under the work
made for hire doctrine when determining employee status, looks to
establish just how much control the hiring party actually demonstrated
over the work at issue. Although Justice Marshall never explicitly
enumerated this factor as being one of those to be addressed, he did
actually describe the circumstances surrounding what the outcome of
this factor would be had it been listed.'36 He wrote that it was true
that "CCNV members directed enough of Reid's work to ensure that
he produced a sculpture that met their specifications. But the extent
of control the hiring party exercises over the details of the product is
not dispositive."' 37 Marshall added that this was the only factor
which could be held in favor of CCNV, and that all other factors
weighed heavily against finding an employment relationship.'
The Third Circuit in Marco realized that, although this factor
was not explicitly written into the Reid decision's list of factors, it
was considered there and should be considered in future holdings.'39
The court said that this was one of only three factors considered by
the court below that would weigh in favor of an employment relationship." It was admitted that "Accent exercised control over the details of the work" and that Accent specifically "supplied jewelry,
props, models, sketches intended to describe the exact composition of
the photographs, and, at some sessions, an Art Director ... Moreover, Accent controlled only the subject matter and composition of

136. Reid, 490 U.S. at 750.
137. Id. (citation omitted).
138. Id.
139. Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1550 & n.4 (3d Cir. 1992). The
Marco court stated. "[i]ndeed, courts should keep this factor in perspective, since it resembles
the 'control of the product' test rejected by the Supreme Court in [Reid]." Id. at 1551 (citations omitted). Remarkably, the Marco court was not alone, nor was it the first court, to
address the actual control factor in making a decision under the work made for hire doctrine.
In M.G.B. Homes, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that, although there was control and direc-

tion exercised over the finished product, a set of architectural drawings, all other circumstances militated against a finding that the drawings were done as a work made for hire. M.G.B.

Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Carter
v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that "[p]laintiffs

apparently had complete artistic freedom to create the Work, and were not given any artistic
direction by the Partnerships. This unfettered artistic freedom is uncharacteristic of an employ-

er-employee relationship.").
140. Marco, 969 F.2d at 1551.
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the images. 141 In further comparing the case at bar to the earlier
Supreme Court decision, the court added that "Accent's control of the
product was thus no greater than the control exercised by the charity
in CCNV... and who was still not an employer."'42 So, whereas
the Marco court started off describing what seemed to be a factor in
favor of employee status, it determined that the actual control exhibited by the hiring party was limited and still not enough to finally
decide in favor of Accent under this condition. 43 As a result, the
actual control demonstrated by the hiring party may be an important
factor upon which future decisions are based.
V.

WEIGHING THE FACTORS

A. No ONE FACTOR IS DETERMINATIVE
It has been established that, as set forth by the Supreme Court in
Reid and as later modified by further lower court decisions, there are
a number of factors to be addressed. The question remains, however,
as to what number of factors in one party's favor determine who
wins a contest over copyright ownership when the issue is whether
the work, when made, was a work made for hire. Furthermore, in the
alternative, is there one factor that is so overwhelmingly dispositive,
that when a party has convincingly proven that that factor is to be
held in that party's favor, the determination of whether the hired
party is an employee under the work made for hire doctrine is no
longer a question of fact but rather a matter of law? The answers to
these questions are not so abundantly clear.
Justice Marshall, in the Reid decision, never accounted for the
weighing of each of the factors.'" As a matter of fact, there is no
mention of the weight of any of the factors at all. However, there is
one conclusion that many court decisions regarding this matter appear
to agree upon: no one factor is determinative.4" What this means is

141. Id.
142. Id. at 1552 (emphasis in original).
143. Id. at 1551-52.
144. This observation was correctly pointed out by Judge Altimari in Aymes v. Bonelli,
980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992), and is the subject of the following subsection.
145. See Reid, 490 U.S. at 752 (citations omitted); Forward v. Thorogood, 985 F.2d 604,
606 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that the lack of compensation was not a decisive fact); Aymes
v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp.
228, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Merchant v. Lymon, 828 F. Supp. 1048, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1993),
modified on other grounds, 848 F. Supp. 29 (1994); Respect Inc. v. Committee On Status of
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that there is no one factor that will automatically lead to a decision
of whether a hired party is an employee or an independent contractor.
46
As was eloquently set forth by the court in Merchant v. Lymon,
"[s]everal factors, no single one of which is determinative, are to be
weighed in determining whether the work was created by an employee or an independent contractor."' 47

B. WEIGHING THE FACTORS
1. Aymes v. Bonelli
In December 1992, the Aymes v. Bonelli decision was handed
down by the Second Circuit."¢ A summary of the facts are as fol-

lows: a computer programmer, Clifford Scott Aymes ("Aymes"),
brought an action for copyright infringement against Jonathan Bonelli,
who was doing business as Island Swimming Sales ("Island"). 49 Island was a corporation that operated a chain of retail swimming pool
and swimming related equipment stores for whom Aymes had created
a series of software programs called "CSALIB," which was used to
maintain inventory, purchasing and transaction records. 50 In 1982,
Aymes left Island and three years later registered CSALIB with the
United States Copyright Office after Bonelli refused to compensate
him for the program's multi-site use."' Aymes then filed suit for
copyright infringement and lost, the district court finding that the
program was a "work made for hire" and that Aymes was an employee under the Copyright Act of 1976.2
In reversing the district court, the Second Circuit's opinion centered around the holdings in the Reid case,' and held that Aymes
was not an employee within the purview of the Act and the "work
made for hire" doctrine.'54 Additionally, the court noted that, although the factors set forth by the Reid case were those to be ad-

Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1117-18 (N.D. Ii. 1993).
146. 828 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), modified on other grounds, 848 F. Supp. 29
(1994).
147. Id.at 1058 (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52).
148. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
149. Id. at 858.
150. Id. at 859.
151. Id.
152. See Aymes v. Bonelli, No. 85 Civ. 2228, 1991 WL 243376, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
12, 1991).
153. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 858-64.
154. Id. at 864.
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dressed, unfortunately Justice Marshall never explained how much
weight should be accorded each factor in the Reid decision."'
2. Method of Determining the Weight to Accord Each Factor
Judge Altimari, writing the decision for the Second Circuit, explained that:
We begin our analysis by noting that the Reid test can be easily
misapplied, since it consists merely of a list of possible considerations that may or may not be relevant in a given case. Reid established that no one factor was dispositive, but gave no direction
concerning how the factors were to be weighed. It does not necessarily follow that because no one factor is dispositive all factors are
equally important, or indeed that all factors will have relevance in
every case." 6
The Second Circuit held not only that all factors may or may not
have different weight in the determination of employee status under
the work made for hire doctrine, but also said that some of the factors that were applied in the Reid test may not apply to a court's
decision at all.'57 Furthermore, Judge Altimari added, "[tihe factors
should not merely be tallied but should be weighed according to their
significance in the case. ... Some factors, therefore, will often have
little or no significance in determining whether a party is an independent contractor or an employee."' 58 The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois agreed with the decision in
Aymes, explaining that the Second Circuit "also sought to structure a
kind of weighted approach under which ... some factors are more
equal than others. For purposes of this opinion it is unnecessary to
decide whether that gloss should be superimposed on what the ulti-

155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 861.
Id.
Id.
Id. In explaining how this approach may be applied, Judge Altimari added:
For example, the factors relating to the authority to hire assistants will not
normally be relevant if the very nature of the work requires the hired party to

work alone. In such a case, that factor should be accorded no weight in applying
the Reid test. Having the authority to hire assistants, however, might have great
probative value where the individual claiming to be an independent contractor does
exercise authority to enlist assistants without prior approval of the party that hired
him. In the latter case, this show of authority would be highly indicative that the

hired party was acting as an independent contractor.
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mate authority - the Supreme Court - has said in [Reid]."'59
It should be emphasized that, because of their significance in
virtually every situation, there are some factors which will undoubted-

ly be addressed in all cases that arise when the employee status of a

hired individual is at issue. 6 ° "These include: (1) the hiring party's
right to control the manner and means of creation; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee benefits; (4) the tax treatment
of the hired party; and (5) whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party."'' Because of their
universal application, the Second Circuit reasoned, these factors
should be given a greater deal of weight in the analysis, "because
they will usually be highly probative of the true nature of the em-

ployment relationship."' 62

The Aymes court was quick to realize that, although the Reid
decision had been handed down two years prior, the test set forth by
the Supreme Court had not yet received widespread application. It
further recognized that other courts had adopted the Reid analysis and

attempted some form of weighted approach by only addressing those
factors that would be significant under the facts of their cases. '
However, there is no indication that any of the other courts have

159. Respect Inc. v. Committee On Status Of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1118 n.11
(N.D. IIl. 1993). Senior District Judge Shadur admittedly took the phrase, "some factors are
more equal than others," from George Orwell's ANIMAL FARM. Id.
160. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 861.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 860-64.
164. Id. In support of this proposition, the Aymes court cited to:
Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a
photographer was an independent contractor while ignoring some factors and noting
that some were 'indeterminate' and should not be considered); MacLean Assocs.,
Inc. v. Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1991) (in
appeal from a directed verdict for hiring party, holding that a computer programmer could be an independent contractor without addressing several of the Reid factors); M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc. 903 F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1990)
(finding that a drafting service operated as an independent contractor to a builder
based on only eight factors, ignoring others); Johannsen v. Brown, 797 F. Supp.
835 (D. Or. 1992) (finding that an artist/printer is a graphic designer based on
several factors, ignoring others); Kunycia v. Melville Realty Co., 755 F. Supp. 566
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding an architect to be an independent contractor on the basis
of only four factors, ignoring others); Kelstall-Whitney v. Mahar, No. 89 Civ.
4684, 1990 WL 69013, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6186 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1990)
(finding that a computer programmer was an independent -contractor based on only
....
a few factors, ignoring others)......
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utilized a weight system that addresses the level of significance a
factor would hold if indeed it applied to the case at bar. Judge
Altimari was concerned with the district court's over-emphasis of
indeterminate and, thus, irrelevant factors having little or no bearing
on the Aymes case." 5
After addressing the five factors that Judge Altimari considered
to be significant in virtually every situation," the court concluded
that Aymes held favor as an independent contractor in three of these
important categories." In analyzing the remaining factors, the court
resolved to address them individually, in accordance with their relative importance in the determination, even though they were admittedly relatively insignificant or negligible in weight because of either
their indeterminateness or inapplicability to the facts of the Aymes
case. 6 However, they were addressed anyway to show just why
they were relatively insignificant.'69
The "method of payment" factor, though fairly important, was
considered indeterminate because of evidence that was supportive of
both sides. 7 ' Aymes had been paid hourly wages at times, and at
other times a flat fee. 7' This dual payment method made it impossible for the court of appeals to conclude for one side or the other.7
"Whether the work [was] Island's regular business" was a factor that
was held in Aymes's favor by the court of appeals after overruling
the erroneous finding by the court below." However, the factor
was considered inconsequential in evaluating the claim that the work
was made for hire since - even though it was not a regular part of
Island's business to have computer programming performed for it most companies hire support personnel, like Aymes, to help maintain

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 861 (2d Cir. 1992).
See supra text accompanying notes 160-61.
Aymes, 980 F.2d at 862-63.
Id. at 863.
Id.

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The Second Circuit held that:
[tihe district court misinterpreted the category, and its finding is, therefore, erroneous. The purpose of this factor is to determine whether the hired party is performing tasks that directly relate to the objective of the hiring party's business. ....
Because Island Swimming is involved in the business of selling swimming pools,
however, Aymes's programming was not done in the company's regular business.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol12/iss2/7

26

1995]

Wishner: Whose Work is it Anyway?: Revisiting Community for Creative Non-V

The Employer-Employee Relationship Under the "Work Made for Hire" Doctrine

419

their regular business." Another indeterminate factor was the "duration of the relationship" since, although the relationship lasted for a
period of over two years,7" there were undisputed gaps in that period of time indicating non-full-time status, as well as periodic work
relationships with others. 7 ' Thus, although this factor was held in
favor of Island, it carried only little weight."7 Moreover, the "authority to hire assistants" category was meaningless in this situation
since the hired party was not in need of any to complete this function."
After scrutinizing these factors, both the significant and insignificant ones, the Second Circuit held that Island's contention that Aymes
was an employee held strong under only one of the major categories,
and only slightly under another, with the other three holding strongly
in favor of independent contractor status.' 79 The other factors, those
of negligible importance, could not "outweigh the significance [attached] to Island's choice to treat Aymes as an independent contractor
when it was to Island's financial benefit.... [T]he company must
still adhere to the choice it made."' 80 Consequently, the application
of the test, as set forth in Reid, required that the court find Aymes to
be an independent contractor when he created CSALIB for Island. 8'
Judge Altimari, in Aymes, created a somewhat structured approach in the determination of the weight of the applicable factors
when ascertaining the status of a hired party in a copyright infringement action based upon the "work made for hire" doctrine of the
Copyright Act of 1976. First, address the five factors that are considered most significant in virtually every case. Second, address those
factors that remain which demonstrate any relative importance to the
specific facts of the case. Third, address the remaining factors that

174. Id.
175. The court found two years to be enough to be considered "a long period of time."
Id. at 864.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. Other factors addressed but found to be similarly indeterminate or insignificant
were: whether Island was in business; the discretion over when and how long to work; the

location of the work; and the source of the equipment. Id. at 863-64.
179. Id. at 864. The factor found to hold strongly in Island's favor was that it did demonstrate a convincing right to control over the work. The factor that held only slightly in
Island's favor was the right to assign additional projects. The other three - the level of
skill, the provision of benefits, and the tax treatment of Aymes - held conclusively in favor

of non-employee status. Id.
180.
181.

Id.
Id
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have little significance, but may fall to one side or the other. Fourth,
discard those factors which have no significance at all in light of the
facts of the case. Through this approach, an informed decision can be
82
made.
VI. THE MISLEADING LABELS
A. WHEN HIRED AS AN "EMPLOYEE"

It was discussed earlier that the parties' beliefs as to their relationship is a factor to be considered, but it is not dispositive, nor may
it be of considerable importance.' It inherently follows that, when
an individual is expressly hired as an "employee," it does not automatically make the hired individual an "employee," especially one for
purposes of copyright ownership within the scope of the "work made
for hire" doctrine of the Copyright Act of 1976.184
Similarly, if the hired party holds himself out as an employee of
the hiring party to a third party, it does not necessarily make him an
"employee" for the purposes of the Act.'85 In MacLean Associates,
the Third Circuit stated:
Nor does the district court's determination that Mr. MacLean
was an apparent agent of Mercer at the time he wrote [the software
program] survive scrutiny. There is no doubt that Mr. MacLean,
with Mercer's permission, held himself out to the NYSE as a Mercer employee even after he left the company. Under the Supreme
Court's decision in Reid and the language of the Copyright Act,
however, the central focus of the work for hire doctrine is upon the
relationship between the person performing the work and the person

182. See Respect Inc. v. Committee On Status of Women, 815 F. Supp. 1112, 1117-18
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (agreeing with Aymes in that a weighted approach, as opposed to a mere
tallying of the factors, is a more appropriate method).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 105-09.
184. See Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., 969 F.2d 1547, 1548 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that the district court erroneously "bootstrapped" the term "staff photographer" as a synonym for the term "employee," by converting a finding into a legal conclusion: "Marco was
not an independent contractor, but was hired as the staff photographer for the magazine")
(citation omitted); accord MacLean Assocs., Inc. v. Win. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc.,
952 F.2d 769, 777-78 (3d Cir. 1991).
185. MacLean Assocs., 952 F.2d at 777-78. Here, the creator of a software program,
Barry MacLean, for Wn. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc. ("Mercer"), designed the program
for use by a third party, the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). Id. at 773. MacLean,
after terminating his relationship with Mercer, continued to solicit business from the NYSE.
l.
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paying him to perform the work. Here, Mr. MacLean performed the
work, and Mercer paid him to perform the work. The fact that the
NYSE thought that Mr. MacLean was an employee of Mercer at the
relevant time is of no moment. Mercer, the party who seeks to
invoke the work for hire doctrine, was aware of the true nature of
its relationship with Mr. MacLean at all times. Mercer is not a third
party who was fooled in any way by Mr. MacLean's representations
to the NYSE."8 6
This ruling emphasizes the fact that the party's belief may be of no
consequence at all. Here, all three of the parties - the hired individual, the hiring party, and a third party for whom the hiring party was
doing business - all believed, at the time, that Mr. MacLean was an
agent for Mercer.' However, the court still concluded that, after
considering the belief of the parties and the reasons for which he was
hired, "[hie may or may not be an agent."' 8
B. WHEN THE WORK IS DESIGNATED AS A

"WORK MADE FOR HIRE"
When applying for a copyright through the Copyright Office, you
are required to indicate, in your application, whether the work sought
to be registered for copyright was made as a work for hire.'89 However, merely checking the "Work Made For Hire" box on the applica-tion does not suffice as being dispositive proof that it was such.' 9°
In Relational Design & Technology, Inc. v. Data Team Corp.,9 ' the
defendants hired the plaintiff to modify an existing computer program
to compensate for DTC's needs in a dental office management system.'" The court, in denying summary judgment for DTC, stated
that "the [copyright registration] certificate does not, as defendants
contend, conclusively determine that RDT completed the dental management program as a work-made-for-hire."' 93

186. Id. at 777-78.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 778 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF AGENCY § 2(3) (1958)).
189.

See, e.g., 6A Fed Proc Forms § 17.22(2)(a) (1987).

190. See JBJ Fabrics Inc. v. India Garments Inc., No. 92 Civ. 8324, 1993 WL 330464, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 1993); Relational Design & Technology, Inc. v. Data Team Corp.,

Civ. A. No. 91-2452-0, 1992 WL 350219, at *3 (D. Kan. Oct. 21, 1992).
191. Civ. A. No. 91-2452-0, 1992 WL 350219 (D. Kan. Oct. 21, 192). Relational Design & Technology, Inc. and Data Team Corporation are' hereinafter referred to as "RDT"
and "DTC," respectively.
192. Id. ht *1.

193. Id. at *3.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1995

29

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1995], Art. 7
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 12:2

The converse will also hold true. In Frost Belt International
Recording Enterprises, Inc. v. Cold Chillin' Records,'94 a motion
was made to set aside a default judgment order in favor of the plaintiff for copyright infringement of a song entitled "A Girl Named
Kim."'95 Since, as the court pointed out, there was a contractual
agreement that the exclusive copyright ownership of all master recordings made by the defendant were to be granted to the plaintiff, the
distribution of the phonorecords were exclusively held by the contractually determined copyright owners." In a footnote, however, the
court added that they rejected the plaintiff's contention that the Copyright Registration Certificate itself was determinative that "A Girl
Named Kim" was not a work made for hire simply because the plaintiff checked off the box on the certificate indicating that the work
was "not made for hire."'' 9
One thing that the indication of a "work made for hire" on the
Copyright Registration Certificate does provide is that the application
will serve as prima facie evidence that it was or was not a "work
made for hire."'"8 However, a court cannot grant summary judgment
as a matter of law on this basis alone if factual questions remain
which may or may not alter that determination.'" Once the prima
facie case has been established by demonstrating that the work in
question was registered at the Copyright Office as a "work made for
hire" or "not made for hire," the opposing party has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of validity which that certification
holds.2

194. 758 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
195. Id. at 132-33.
196. Id. at 137.
197. Id. at 137 n.12.
198. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988).
199. Relational Design & Technology, 1992 WL 350219, at *3.
200. JBJ Fabrics Inc. v. India Garments Inc., No. 92 Civ. 8324, 1993 WL 330464, at *6
n3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 1993) (citing JBJ Fabrics, Inc. v. Brylane, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 107,
109 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
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VII. THE OTHER TEST
A. SPECIALLY ORDERED OR COMMISSIONED WORKS

Although this discussion has been primarily concerned with the
definitional approach to the term "employee" under the first of the
two subsections of the "work made for hire" doctrine of the Copyright Act of 1976,"' some attention should be given to the second
means by which a work made for hire may be procured. This second
definition of the work made for hire doctrine reads:
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a
compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material
for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work
made for hire.2
This subsection provides for an alternate method by which a hiring
party can obtain the copyright ownership in a "specially ordered or
commissioned" work without having to rely on the criteria discussed
in the earlier part of this text.
B. THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER § 101(2)

1. The Nine Enumerated Categories
Under § 101(2), it must first be realized that "not every work
prepared by an independent contractor on special order or commission
is considered the equivalent of a work made for hire."' 3 Before any
work can be considered under this subsection of the work made for
201. 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1988).
202. 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1988). The Act defines a "supplementary work" as
a work prepared for publication as a secondary adjunct to a work by another author for the purpose of introducing, concluding, illustrating, explaining, revising,
commenting upon, or assisting in the use of the other work, such as forewords,
afterwards, pictorial illustrations, maps, charts, tables, editorial notes, musical arrangements, answer material for tests, bibliographies, appendixes, and indexes, and
an 'instructional text' is a literary, pictorial, or graphic work prepared for publication and with the purpose of use in systematic instructional activities.

Id
203. 1 MELvILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B][2][a],
at 5-36 (1994) (citations omitted).
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hire doctrine, it must qualify as one of the nine enumerated categories
specifically listed in the Act.'

Otherwise, the specially ordered or

commissioned work will not qualify under the doctrine.2°
In Reid, there was no need for the Supreme Court to address this

issue because, as Justice Marshall pointed out, there was no claim by
the petitioners "that the statue satisfies the terms of §101(2). Quite
clearly, it does not. Sculpture does not fit within any of the nine

categories of 'specially ordered or commissioned' works enumerated
in that subsection ....

2

6

2. The Requirement of a Written Instrument
In addition to the requirement that the work be specially ordered
or commissioned under one of the nine enumerated categories specified in that subsection,2° it must also be accompanied by a signed
writing providing that the procured work be designated a work made
for hire under the copyright ownership of the hiring party. 2 8 However, it must be noted that, "[i]f alternatively, the work is prepared by
an employee within the scope of his employment, no such writing
is
2°9
hire.'
for
'made
one
work
the
constitute
to
order
in
required

Conversely, "in order to render a commissioned work into one
made for hire, a written instrument is a necessary but not a sufficient

condition," as it still must be one of the nine enumerated categories. 210 For instance, a signed contract between two parties agreeing

to render the copyright of a specially ordered architectural work to
the hiring party is not sufficient alone.2 '

204. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
205. 1 MELv= B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON CopyIcTr § 5.03[B][2][a],
at 5-38 (1994) (citing May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.
1980); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D.
Neb. 1982)) (other citations omitted); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.NJ. 1981).
206. Reid, 490 U.S. at 738; see also Schmidt v. Holy Cross Cemetery, Inc., No. 92-2436JWL, 1993 WL 512414, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 2, 1993) (holding that a plat for a cemetery is
a "specially ordered or commissioned" work under the work made for hire doctrine).
207. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text
208. See Rubloff Inc. v. Donahue, No. 93 C 0457, 1994 WL 161098, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 11, 1994) (holding a signed agreement to be a "necessary prerequisite"); Frost Belt Int'l
Recording Enters., Inc. v. Cold Chillin' Records, 758 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding
that a phonorecord was a work made for hire because a written agreement was signed by the
parties rendering the copyright ownership of all Master Recordings by the defendant to the

plaintiff).
209.
at 5-39
210.
211.

1 MELVillE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.03[B][2][b],
(1994).
1 id.
See May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1980).
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Finally, the written instrument has to be signed by both parties
in order for it to be valid. In Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco
Corp.,212 the question of whether the photographs taken for an office

supply catalogue were a work made for hire was at issue.213 The
court, in denying the legal conclusion that the work was made for
hire since the written document accompanying the agreement was one

for a specially ordered or commissioned work not signed by both
parties, said that "Itihe statutory language is 'signed by them,'
that is, by both parties, and it means what it says."2 4

...

VIII. 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT
Although the Copyright Act of 1976 was a comprehensive revision of the 1909 Act,2" 5 all those works which were created prior to
the implementation of the later Act are still subject to the earlier

Act's laws.216 As such, a short discussion of the recent treatment of
the "work made for hire" doctrine under the 1909 Act is warranted.

As discussed earlier,2" the only provision for a work made for
hire under the 1909 Act was a single clause in one section explaining

that "the word 'author' shall include an employer in the case of
works made for hire."2 The courts, who were left the task of defining the terms "employer" and "author,"2 19 concluded that the

212. 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
213. Id. at 411.
214. Id. at 412 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1988); PAuL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCntLEs LAW AND PRACICE, § 4.3.2.2, at 405 & n.54 (1989)); see also Rubloff Inc. v.
Donahue, No. 93 C 0457, 1994 WL 161098, at *2 (N.D. IM. Apr. 11, 1994) (quoting
Schiller & Schmidt for the same proposition and denying relief under this argument for the
lack of a signature by one of the parties); Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238,
1244 (D.S.C. 1992) (holding that section 201 of the 1976 Act, "places the burden on the
employee to show the existence of a writing granting the employee the copyright in any
work for hire," and that "[c]ourts have also found that unwritten understandings or writings
not containing the signatures of both parties are insufficient to rebut the statutory presunption!).
215. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (current version at §§ 101-810 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)).
216. The effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976 was January 1, 1978, where not
specifically expressed otherwise within the Act. Pub. L. 94-553, § 102, 90 Stat. 2598 (Oct.
19, 1976) (Transitional and Supplementary Provisions).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
218. Copyright Act of 1909, ch.1, § 26 (1909), as amended by Act of July 30, 1947, ch.
391, 61 Stat. 652, revised in its entirety by The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553,
90 Stat. 2541 (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
219. Interestingly, Congress again failed to define these terms in the current Act, leaving
room for different interpretations by the courts.
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work for hire doctrine applied only to those works made by employees in the regular course of their employment." Commissioned
works were generally presumed to have been impliedly conveyed to
the hiring party, along with its copyright ownership." Additionally,
"during the last dozen years of the 1909 Act, the courts expanded the
definition of 'employer' to include a hiring party who had the right
to control or supervise the artist's work."'
In 1991, the Ninth Circuit was called upon to decide, in Law
Enforcement Training and Research Associates ("LETRA") v. City of
San Francisco,' whether the district court below erred in granting
a summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff's copyright infringement claim against the defendant. 24 The court said that, "under the
1909 Act, two considerations are necessary: (1) whether the work in
question was created within the scope of an employment relationship;
and (2) if so, whether the parties intended that the copyright in the
work vest in the employee."
For the "within in the scope of an
employment relationship" prong, the court, in reversing and remanding the summary judgment decision based upon the existence of genuine issues of material fact, first pointed out that there was no evidence in the record that indicated that the Manual was developed at
the request of the defendant.' Second, reference was made to the
expenses incurred by the opposing parties.' Third, the court looked
at whether the defendant exercised actual control and had the right to
control the development of the workY" Finally, it was noted that
the plaintiff had exploited the use of the Manual for several years
without any proprietary interference by the defendant. 9 The second
prong of the two-pronged test was never fully addressed because, as

220.
221.

Reid 490 U.S. at 744.
4d. (citations omitted).

222. 1 MELVLLE B. NimmER & DAvID N'mMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §
5.03[B][1][a][i], at 5-13 (1994) (citations omitted).
223. Nos. 90-15482, 90-15638, 1991 WL 172416 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 1991).
224. Id. at *1. Here, the work at issue was a "Manual" used by the Richmond Police
Department. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that the holding in this case should have no
precedential value, but for purposes of this article, it serves as a relevant basis for an intro-

duction to the courts' recent treatment of the work made for hire doctrine under the Copyright Act of 1909.
225.

Id. (citing May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368-69 (9th Cir.

1980)).
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id
l
Id.
Id
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the Ninth Circuit pointed out, the district court below erroneously
concluded that the question of the intention of the parties concerning
the ownership of the work's copyright was only "collateral and [had]
no bearing on' 30the dispositive issue of whether the Manual was a
work-for-hire."
In 1993, the First Circuit, in Forward v. Thorogood,"1 affirmed
the district court's decision to enjoin the appellant from making commercial use of the tapes he owned which carried recordings of the
appellee's band.1 2 The district court applied, at the appellant's request, the "instance and expense" test to determine the intentions of
the parties and found that the evidence did not support a holding in
his favor. z 3 The First Circuit held that the trial judge's decision was
amply supported by the evidence, noting "Forward was a fan and
friend who fostered this effort, not the Archbishop of Saltzburg commissioning works by Mozart." ' 4
Later in 1993 the Southern District of New York was called
upon to decide two cases in which the issue was raised whether a
work fell under the work made for hire doctrine pursuant to the 1909
Copyright Act. The first of these was Merchant v. Lymon, in which a
declaratory judgment was sought as to the copyright ownership of the
popular song "Why Do Fools Fall in Love?" ' As in LETRA, the
court used a two prong test to decide if the work was made for hire:
(1) whether the creator was an employee and (2) whether the parties
intended that the work vest in the employee. 6 For the question of
whether the creator was an employee, the court, interestingly, applied
the factored test as set forth in Reid and subsequent cases. It addressed "[s]everal factors, no single one of which is determinative.... to be weighed in determining whether
the work was created
''237
contractor.
independent
an
or
employee
by an
The second holding came in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.

230. Id. at *2.
231. 985 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1993).
232. Id. The plaintiff-appellant had originally sought a declaratory judgment that he held
the common-law copyright to the recordings. Forward v. Thorogood, 758 F. Supp. 782 (D.

Mass. 1991).
233. Forward, 985 F.2d at 606.
234. Id.
235. 828 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), modified on other grounds, 848 F. Supp. 29

(1994).
236. Merchant, 828 F. Supp. at 1057-58. Here the question was whether the parties actually agreed to joint ownership. Id. at 1056.

237. Id. at 1058 (citations omitted).
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Dumas, 8 where the court was called upon to decide whether
Jennifer Dumas owned the copyright to Patrick Nagel's drawings. 2 9
Here, as in Forwardv. Thorogood, the court applied an "instance and
expense test" to determine whether the parties intended the copyright
to be held by the hiring party, once again discussing factors very
similar to those set forth in Reid and other "work made for hire"
decisions under the 1976 Act.24
So, whereas the two-pronged test has been applied in recent
years in determining the copyright ownership of articles when invoking the work made for hire doctrine under the Copyright Act of 1909,
some consideration has been given to those factors addressed by the
courts to similar works made after the inception of the 1976 Act.
This provides a fascinating, yet current, approach to the work made
for hire doctrine as applied to items copyrighted prior to January 1,
1978.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The employer-employee relationship necessary to invoke the
"work made for hire" doctrine under the Copyright Act of 1976 when
there is no formal structure between the parties, though discussed in
depth by the Supreme Court in Community for Creative Non-Violence
v. Reid, was not sufficient to properly adjudicate such a matter when
determining copyright ownership. The list of factors supplied by the
Court was not wholly expansive, nor was it supplied in such a fashion as to accurately decide the weight to accord each factor. Indeed,
the Court never proposed a weighted approach of any kind.
The holding in Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., expanded the
list of factors to include those characteristics omitted from the Supreme Court's decision but essential for "work made for hire" adjudication. Additionally, this and other federal courts' decisions have
helped to define the factors in a manner that makes it easier to allocate them among the parties. Most importantly, the decision in Aymes
v. Bonelli provided a more structured approach by formulating a
method of weighing these factors on a case-by-case basis. Through

238. 831 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
239. Id. Jennifer Dumas ("Dumas") is Patrick Nagel's widow. Dumas was also party to
another lawsuit in which she claimed copyright ownership to her late husband's works under

the work made for hire doctrine. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989);
see also supra note 37.
240. Playboy Enters., 831 F. Supp. at 311-12.
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the additional precedent set by these holdings, an informed decision
can be made under the "work made for hire" doctrine as to ascertain
a work's correct copyright ownership.
Corey L. Wishner
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